

# Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Change

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25 April 2019

**Abstract:** Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional set-up of a country. Which specific policies change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after coups or transitions implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of legislative and judicial institutions around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from the remains in the political system of that elite. Using the Bjørnskov-Rode coup data, preliminary results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not.

**Keywords:** Coups, Institutional Quality, Autocracy; Corruption; Judicial Constraints

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## **1. Introduction**

Coups and regime transitions are events that are almost always intended to change the basic institutional set-up of a country. In coups, some group – typically within the political elite or the military – for some reason, attempts to take power through illegal, and often violent means. These reasons are regularly depicted as blind ambition and lust for power in the popular media, but often also include a desire to change policies and institutions in the favour of the incoming elite (Aidt and Leon, 2019; Bjørnskov et al., 2018).

What those specific policies are and what their consequences may be remains largely unknown. The intended policies and institutional changes are probably also diverse and context-dependent, as autocrats have incentives to suppress the population, as well as, other potential parts of the political elite, but they also have strong incentives to protect the quality of basic institutions and some degree of freedom of speech and media (Egorov et al., 2009; Boudreaux and Holcombe, 2013). In most cases, the successful implementation of new policies or institutional changes after a coup implies that some form of existing political or judiciary barrier must be removed. Yet, in other cases, it is an arguably more effective strategy for the new regime to increase certain barriers in order to protect either the regime or the policy and institutional changes.

In this paper, we focus on what more precisely happens to the quality of legislative and judicial institutions around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when the coup is conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of that elite in the political system. Further, the type of regime replaced may influence the changes in institutions. However, all are likely to be interested in actual gain for whichever group or segment they represent.

We test these implications in a large panel of approximately 10,000 observations from 169 countries. Applying new data on coups and coup attempts from Bjørnskov and Rode (in press), we find that successful coups are associated with increased levels of corruption and a reduction in judicial constraints. These results are driven primarily by successful coups by the military and are robust to controlling for whether a country has democratic institutions and the level of checks and balances that it has in place to constrain government, as well as the level of development. We also find that failed civilian coups are associated with a reduction in judicial constraints. We also examine whether the rank of coup leaders matters for the institutional effects. Our results suggest that successful coups by high and low ranking military officials are associated with increases in corruption. Successful military coups staged by high ranking officials are also associated with reductions in judicial constraints, as are failed coups by high ranking civilian leaders. Additionally, we explore whether the type of incumbent regime in place influences the impact of coups on institutional change. We find that successful civilian coups levied against civilian autocracies are associated with more corruption, but less corruption in military autocracies. We find qualitatively similar results for judicial constraints.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a set of theoretical considerations. Section 3 describes the data and our empirical strategy, which we employ in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

## **2. Theoretical considerations**

In order to theorize about how coups and coup attempts may change institutions, we first outline why coup attempts occur. We note that three conditions have to be met before it is likely that a coup attempt occurs. We refrain from discussing why coups might succeed, as success is notoriously hard to predict and contains a large random component (Powell and Thyne, 2011;

Bjørnskov et al., 2018). We then discuss how coups may change institutions and the type of coup maker – military or civilian – may influence institutions and why the type of government – military, civilian, democratic – being overthrown might matter.

As a first, a coup maker or a group of coup makers must hold the belief that they ‘can do better’, i.e. that their choice of policies and institutions is likely to lead to better outcomes for themselves and the interests they represent. Second, they must share an analysis of the risk associated with performing a coup attempt that on balance makes an attempt more attractive – given its likely outcomes – than the status quo. As such, coup attempts may be more likely in recessions or when the incumbent government is in other ways perceived to be weak (Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2000). Finally, the coup makers must be able to bear the costs of organizing a coup and coordinating ex ante or ex post political support for the potential coup government. Although often neglected by previous studies, all coup makers must therefore bear the necessary coordination costs of overcoming free-rider problems and similar organizational challenges (cf. Olson, 1965).

### ***2.1 Interests***

First, coup-makers must have plans for their choice of policies and institutions that are beneficial to the interests they represent. As hypothesized by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2013), every autocracy relies on support from an effective majority or at least a blocking minority of its selectorate, just as any democratic government relies on the continued support from either a majority or a blocking minority of the electorate. As such, military dictatorships in general represent military interests, which include military spending and a special status for military personnel. However, military interests may also include special treatment of e.g. military-owned enterprises, such as engineering firms and specific institutions of education, and more individual interests such as judicial exemptions and freedom from prosecution for a military elite.

Similarly, as hypothesized in Bjørnskov et al. (2018), civilian autocracies rest on the support of particular background interest. Yet, contrary to military dictatorships, the main selectorate consists of civilian interests such as specific industrial interests and labour unions that seek special treatment, protection from competition, or regulation. Similarly to military dictatorships, the support interests of civilian autocracies can also include individual interests such as politicians in power who enjoy immunity, which they might lose when out of power.

As such, members of an incumbent elite – regardless of whether they are primarily military or civilian – are not in general interested in breaking up existing structures. If anything, coup-makers from the incumbent elite are most likely to gather support for their coup, either *ex ante* or *ex post*, if they can deliver *more* of the same. Singh (2014, 91) for example shows how General Acheampong effectively used existing power and command structures within the Thai military to coordinate his 1975 autogolpe, and subsequently benefited the military substantially.

Conversely, coups led by individuals outside of the elite / elites may be more likely to break up institutional structures as the new people in power do not rely on existing structures, may not have benefitted from them, and do not need to offer substantial benefits to the supporting interests of the former incumbent. As such, coup attempts led by lower-ranking officers and groups outside the political elite may not necessarily lead to, e.g., more corruption or overall changes in policies and institutions, but need only redistribute special treatment, support etc. In addition, it remains a possibility that successful coups led by individuals or groups outside of the incumbent elite may lead to less corruption and better institutions, if the incumbents used weak institutions to overexploit central interests in society.

## ***2.2. Strategies***

Another element of coups and coup attempts is the strategy adopted by the coup-makers. As originally described by Olson (1982), the basic strategy is decided by the effective time horizon along

which coup-makers plan. In Olson's words, the choice is between acting like a roving bandit with a short time horizon or a stationary bandit with a long time horizon.

Politicians, including both the incumbent government and potential coup-makers, may reach the conclusion that their position is precarious and odds are that they will be ousted within relatively few years. They face short time horizons, making short-run effects of policies and institutions salient in decision-making (Acemoglu et al., 2001). In other words, knowing that most coup governments last on average about four years (Powell and Thyne, 2011; Bjørnskov and Rode, in press), the optimal strategy for many governments may best be termed a 'grab-and-run' strategy in which both incumbents and coup leaders will plunder the country as much as possible (Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2000). Such strategies arguably require that a number of formal barriers to decision-making are dismantled or can be ignored after the coup.

Conversely, governments and coup-makers who can reasonably expect to stay in power for some time will optimally adopt longer-term strategies. This implies that their political incentives are consistent with erecting or maintaining institutions that allow the general population to improve their standing while the political elite are able to maintain their specific benefits (Olson, 1982). Such institutions are much more likely to limit corruption problems and rent-seeking, and allow at least some level of political independence of judicial institutions and other branches of the public bureaucracy (Boudreaux and Holcombe, 2013).

Overall, the combination of different strategies and support interests implies that different types of coups may have different effects on corruption and judicial independence. In particular, we would argue that coups that are more stable and those led by individuals from outside the incumbent elite are less likely to cause increases in corruption and deteriorating judicial quality while those conducted by members of the incumbent elite may either exacerbate such problems or, in some cases, simply perpetuate them.

Wintrobe (2012) explains this type of behaviour by arguing that those at the top need to use internal governance to appease younger potential rivals from engaging in a coup. Using the dictator's dilemma from Tullock (2005), where autocrats will overpay potential rivals to prevent a coup, Wintrobe examines how the autocrat sets up the rules of the game so that he can survive. He uses the example of a CEO requiring loyalty from subordinates for the company to be successful. This is similar to the work of Shleifer and Summers (1988) who argue that implicit contracts are important so that stakeholders will make relationship-specific investments. Once these investments are made, however, the ex-ante rents from breaching the contract may make takeover more attractive.

As with sellers in the marketplace, rational politicians have incentives to provide citizens with trust that the government will keep its promises (Wintrobe 1990). Wintrobe also looks at the reciprocal that politicians rely upon citizens for support. He uses political loyalty – “a long-term ‘attachment’ on the part of an individual to an organization or institution.” (p. 853). When politicians land a pork barrel project or patronage job for constituents beyond what a technocrat would, then the expectation is that his constituents will reciprocate with support. We should expect that rational actors will behave in this way under democracy, as well as, autocracy. Thus constituents receive rents and the politician receives loyalty. The alternative to loyalty for the autocrat is to use repression. Since providing rents in payment for loyalty and increasing repression are both costly, Wintrobe argues that the dictator must choose both the level of repression and of loyalty. Wintrobe (1990) cites findings by Norlinger (1977) and Paldam (1987) that military coups are usually unstable and end quickly relative to civilian coups. He assumes that military leaders have more power in repression but greater difficulty gaining political support. As a result, their tenure will be shorter.

In most cases we expect that coups will increase corruption and reduce judicial independence. However, the extent to which these change will depend on both who is making the coup and the type of government that is in place prior to the coup. Coups can be perpetrated by high-level

military, low-level military, or civilian actors. They may replace a government run by a military dictatorship, civilian autocracy, or a democratically elected government. Because the coup makers will need to consolidate power, the effect on corruption and judicial independence may differ depending upon the type of government replaced.

As the coup leaders consolidate control, or in the case of a failed coup as the incumbents further enforce their control, both corruption and judicial independence will decrease. However, the extent to which this occurs might depend upon the coup makers and the incumbents. Thus we have three possible coup groups replacing three possible governments. We expect that when a similar group leads a coup against a similar regime – high-level military against military dictatorship, civilian against civilian autocracy and thus what we might term intra-institutional coups – the consequences for judicial independence and corruption will be less than when the coups are led by differing groups representing different selectorates. This might occur in part because the institutions in place under the current regime should be similar to those that the replacing regime would rationally install. However, Shen-Bayh (2018) finds that autocrats are more repressive to insiders than to outsiders and they engage in this repression through their judicial strategy. As such, for failed coups and perhaps coups replacing similar regimes, we should expect to see greater judicial repression as a signal to insiders to deter future coups.

When a coup is led by a group that is not similar to the existing regime (an inter-institutional coup), then the impact on corruption and judicial independence may be larger if the coup is successful because the new regime will establish institutions that better suit their interests. Likewise, for a failed coup, the incumbent regime may become more corrupt and reduce judicial independence in a way to reduce the power of the failed coup leaders and its followers as a means to reduce the likelihood of future coup attempts. For example Easton and Siverson (2018) find that when leaders survive a failed coup, the stronger their response to the coup leaders in terms of purging them, the



longer the leader's tenure. We expect that successful coups will lead to greater changes in institutions than failed coups since the coup leaders will want to change the institutions to better suit their goals. For failed coups, the incumbents might become harsher, but the changes might be less dramatic since their institutions are already in place.

We have assumed that military coups occur to benefit the military elite. However, civilian coups may occur to bring about a positive institutional change (i.e., less corruption; greater judicial independence). If this is the case, we expect the influence of civilian coups on institutions to be greater when replacing a military dictatorship than when replacing a civilian dictatorship. We examine these relationships below.

### 3. Methodology and data

In this section, we describe the methodology and data used in our empirical analysis. Our main results are estimated using a fixed effects estimator of our baseline model:

$$Inst_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Inst_{i,t-2} + \beta_2 CoupSucc_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 CoupFail_{i,t-1} + X'_{i,t-1} \gamma + c_i + u_{i,t}$$

where  $i$  and  $t$  denote the country and year;  $Inst$  is the measure of institutional quality,  $CoupSucc$  and  $CoupFail$  are dummy variables indicating a successful and unsuccessful coup attempt, and are coded to the first coup attempt if multiple attempts in a given year;  $X$  is a matrix of control variables; and  $c_i$  and  $u_{i,t}$  denote an unobserved country fixed effect and idiosyncratic error term. We extend the baseline model to account for the type of coup attempt, allowing for differential effects of successful and failed civilian and military coups. The coup variables, as well as the other independent variables, are lagged one period relative to the dependent variable to allow time for changes in corruption to be observed. We include a lag of institutions to account for their persistence over time (North, 1971, 1991), but we lag it by two years to minimize the potential for coup effects to be picked up contemporaneously in the corruption measures from the same year. Our dataset covers up to 166

countries and spans the period 1950-2018. Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis and a correlation matrix is provided in appendix Table A.2. As an illustration of the data, appendix Table A.8 provides an overview of all coups and coup attempts recorded in the database since 2000.

### ***3.1 Corruption***

We are primarily concerned with economic corruption in the public sphere, or “the use of public office for private gains, where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal” (Bardhan, 1997, p. 1321). We therefore use as our primary measure the political corruption index from the Varieties of Democracy version 7.1 database (Coppedge et al., 2016, 2017; Pemstein et al., 2017). It is a composite measure of the pervasiveness of political corruption for a given country-year that captures corruption in different areas and levels of the political realm, including corruption in the public sector, the judiciary, the legislature, and in the executive branch. It accounts for both petty and grand corruption, bribery and theft, as well as corruption aimed at influencing law-making and that affecting implementation of the law. Higher scores are associated with more corruption. Table 1 describes the four distinct components of the political corruption index, which is derived as the average of the four measures.<sup>1</sup>

*Insert table 1 about here*

### ***3.2 Judicial constraints***

We define judicial constraints as institutional rules that safeguard the independence of the judiciary from interference of the government or other parties in dispute. Judicial constraints are essential to

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<sup>1</sup> For readers interested in the V-Dem approach to measurement and its comparability to alternative measures, McMann et al. (2016) provides a detailed discussion of the measurement methodology and statistical validation of the corruption measures.

ensure that a country's legal system provides "security of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and the mutually agreeable settlement of disputes" necessary to facilitate a smoothly functioning market economy. Without judicial constraints, individuals and businesses will lack confidence to enter into contracts (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003, p. 413-414; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). We use as our measure of judicial constraints the high court independence variable from the V-Dem dataset. It reflects the frequency with which the high court in the judicial system makes decisions of salient consequence to the government that merely reflect the desires of the ruling government in spite of the sincere and independent view of the judiciary and the legal record.

### *3.3 Coups d'état*

We define a coup attempt as the attempt to effectively seize "executive authority through the threat of use of force" (Marinov and Goemans, 2014, p. 801). In addition, we follow common practice by restricting coups to events that can at most take a week, which separates them from longer-running civil wars and insurgencies (Powell and Thyne, 2011). We therefore use the coup data from the recently developed Regime Type and Regime Change dataset (Bjørnskov and Rode, in press), which provides information on failed and successful coups for 192 sovereign nations and 16 self-governing territories over the period 1950-2018. It also indicates whether each of the 537 coup attempts were led by former military members, a group of civilians, or in a few cases a member of the royal family, as well as the military or civilian rank of the coup leader<sup>2</sup>. Slightly less than half of the coup attempts were successful (243 out of 537). The majority of all coup attempts were led by former military members (393 out of 537), with another 132 led by civilians. In some country-years (32 out of 490), multiple coup attempts were staged and information on all coup attempts is available in the dataset.

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<sup>2</sup> We prefer the new database in Bjørnskov and Rode (in press) over alternatives, as it offers more information on coup leaders than most other databases. In addition, the same information is available for failed as for successful coups.

The dataset also provides information on the primary coup leaders such as their age and military or civilian rank.<sup>3</sup>

In our baseline model, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a successful coup (CoupSuccess) occurred in a given country-year as well as a dummy variable indicating whether a failed coup (CoupFail) occurred. This allows us to estimate the potentially differential effects of failed and successful coups on political corruption. In country-years for which multiple coups were attempted, we coded events as a failed coup if all attempts failed and as a successful coup if any of the coup attempts were successful. In subsequent models, we control for the type of coup in addition to the outcome. We therefore include the following set of four dummy variables: (1) successful military coup (MilCoupSuccess); (2) failed military coup (MilCoupFail); (3) successful civilian coup (CivCoupSuccess); and (4) failed civilian coup (CivCoupFail). This allows us to estimate the potentially differential effects of coups on corruption by coup type and outcome. Because only a few of the coup attempts were led by members of the royal family (12 out of 530), who typically also have a military rank (Bjørnskov and Rode, in press), we coded these occurrences as military coup attempts. For our analysis, we coded to the first coup attempt for a given country-year in cases in which multiple coup attempts occurred.

In some models, we also include a dummy variable indicating if multiple coups were attempted in a given country-year (MultiCoup). We also test whether the rank of the coup leader matters for the effect of coups on political corruption. We account for the leader rank by including separate high and low rank leader dummies for each of the four coup attempt dummies described above. Specifically, military leaders with a military rank index above 7 were classified as high-rank

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<sup>3</sup> In results not reported, we controlled for the age of the coup leader by introducing a dummy variable for leaders over the age 60. Age was not a significant predictor of institutional change and controlling for it did not affect the results.

leaders, while those ranked 7 or below were classified as low-rank leaders. For civilian coup leaders, former or current presidents or prime ministers were classified as high-rank officials, while all others were classified as low-rank leaders.

### ***3.4 Control variables***

We control for several economic and institutional factors in our analysis. First, we control for whether a country was a democracy in a given year using Bjørnskov and Rode's (in press) update of the dichotomous indicator in Cheibub et al. (2010). While the democracy variable indicates whether a country has participatory political institutions that allow for effectively contested elections, which may serve as a meta-institution for holding accountable to the public political actors for abstracting too many rents (Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 2008) and for developing broad-based economic institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Rodrik, 2000), it does not account for the degree to which the actions of public sector officials are institutionally constrained (Elkins, 2000). Public sector officials who are not institutionally constrained face lower costs to engage in acts of corruption (Holcombe, 2013; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). We therefore also control for the level of checks and balances in place to constrain the actions of government officials at various levels and branches using the horizontal accountability index from the V-Dem dataset (ChecksBalances), which is based on expert evaluations of the question, "To what extent is the "ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?" In some specifications, we also control for the level of economic development using the real level of per capita GDP using data from the Penn World Tables as our primary measure, supplemented with historical data from The Maddison Project (Bolt and Zanden, 2014), which we ensure refer to the same base year.

#### **4. Empirical results – do coups lead to institutional changes?**

Exploring the raw data, a first indication is given by Figure 1 in which we plot the average changes in judicial constraints and political corruption around successful coups. While both military and civilian coups are typically associated with more political corruption, although to somewhat varying degrees, we find that coups led by individuals with high military rank strongly tend to dismantle judicial constraints on their executive powers. In the following, we therefore explore if these first indications also hold up to proper tests.

*Insert Figure 1 about here*

##### ***4.1 Coups and corruption***

Table 2 presents our results using the overall political corruption index as the dependent variable. Model 1 is our most parsimonious specification as it only controls for the twice-lagged level of political corruption and the CoupSuccess and CoupFail dummies. The results suggest that successful coups are associated with greater political corruption, but failed coups have no effect on political corruption. Model 2 accounts for the coup type, replacing the two coup outcomes from model 1 with the four coup dummies described in section 3.1. Doing so shows that the positive and significant relationship between successful coups and political corruption appears to be driven by successful military coups, as MilCoupSuccess enters positively and is statistically significant at the one percent level. None of the other three coup variables is significant statistically at conventionally accepted levels.

*Insert Table 2 about here*

Model 3 introduces a full set of year fixed effects while model 4 controls for the potential effect of multiple coups in a given country-year by including a dummy variable for multiple coups, which nevertheless is not statistically significant. Model 5 controls for initial democracy, which enters positively but is not statistically significant. Model 6 controls for checks and balances

institutions, which enters negatively and is significant statistically at the one percent level. The results for the coup variables in models 3-6 are nearly identical to those obtained in model 2, with MilCoupSuccess remaining highly significant and its coefficient ranges from 0.019 to 0.020 across these models. In other words, successful military coups are positively and significantly associated with greater political corruption when controlling for the level of democracy, government checks and balances, period fixed effects, and multiple coup attempts in the same year.

Model 7 further accounts for the rank of the coup leader by replacing each of the four coup variables from model 6 with two coup variables that reflect whether the coup leader was a high or low ranking official. The results in this specification suggest that successful military coups by both high (HiMilSuccess) and low ranking (LoMilSuccess) officials have a positive and statistically significant (at ten percent or better) effect on political corruption and the estimated coefficients for the two military success variables, which are far from significantly different from one another ( $p$ -value = 0.86), are similar to the effect sizes for MilCoupSuccess estimated in the preceding models. With the exception of failed military coups by high rank officials (HiMilFail), which enters negatively and is significant statistically at the 10 percent level, the remaining coup variables remain insignificant.

Next, in model 8 we control for the level of economic development by introducing the natural log of per capita GDP to model 6. In this specification, the level of development enters negatively but is not statistically significant. MilSuccess remains positive and is significant statistically at the five percent level, but the coefficient of 0.012 is smaller than in preceding models. The sample size is substantially reduced in this model because of missing GDP data. The number of countries in the sample is reduced from 160 in model 6 to 139 countries in model 8, and the number of total country-year observations declines from 8,409 in model 6 to 6,637 in model 8. As noted by Bennett and Nikolaev (2017), empirical cross-country results are often sensitive to the sample of countries

used. In an effort to discern whether it is controlling for GDP or the change in the sample size driving the change in the coup results, in model 9 we re-estimate model 6 for the sample of countries for which GDP data are available but exclude GDP as a control variable. The results in this specification are nearly identical to those obtained in model 8, suggesting that the change in the sample and not controlling for GDP is the main driver for the difference in results relative to model 6.

Finally, in model 10 we introduce to model 6 a control for the number of previous coup attempts. This variable enters positively but it is not statistically significant while the results for the coup variables are identical to those obtained in model 6. That is, successful military coups exert a positive and statistically significant effect on political corruption, while the other coup variables enter positively but are not statistically significant. Throughout Table 2, the lagged political corruption is significant at the one percent level and the estimated coefficient ranges from 0.902 to 0.917, suggesting that political corruption is highly persistent.

#### ***4.2. Coups and judicial constraints***

As noted in our theoretical considerations, part of the corrupting effects of coups may be due to the incentives faced by coup-makers to dismantle judicial constraints on political decision-making. Table 3 presents results analogous to Table 2 using judicial constraints as our measure of institutional quality in lieu of corruption. In model 1, we find that successful coups are associated with a subsequent reduction in judicial constraints. Failed coups are also negatively associated with judicial constraints, but this result is not statistically significant and may reflect immediate and temporary effects of these events. Models 2-6 and 8-10 allow for differential effects for military and civilian coups, following the same specification structure as Table 2. These results are similar to our corruption estimates in suggesting that successful military coups are associated with a reduction in judicial constraints, even after controlling for democracy, checks and balances, multiple coups in a



given year, and the number of previous coups. The coefficients range from -0.119 to -0.177.

MilCoupSuccess also enters negatively although it is not statistically significant in models 8 or 9, but this result appears to be driven by the reduced sample size rather than controlling for the level of economic development.

Interestingly, we also find that failed civil coups are associated with a reduction in judicial constraints, suggesting that incumbent leaders who survive a failed civilian coup may exert political pressure on judges as a means to use the judicial system to oppressively reduce the chance of future coup attempts. When examining the rank of coup leaders in model 7, we find that erosion of judicial constraints follow successful attempts by high ranking military leaders and failed coups by high ranking civilian leaders. Throughout Table 3, we find that judicial constraints are persistent over time, as the coefficient on the lagged level of constraints ranges from 0.726 to 0.863.

*Insert Table 3 about here*

### ***4.3. Coups, regime type, and institutional change***

Our results thus far suggest that successful military coups are strongly associated with a decline in institutional quality, as indicated by increases in corruption and reductions in judicial constraints.

Our results also suggest, however, that countries with more government checks and balances, most of which are democracies, are less corrupt and have higher levels of judicial constraints. As such, it may be more difficult for successful coup leaders to enact institutional change in initially democratic countries with built-in checks and balances than it is in countries governed by autocratic governments. As noted in our theoretical considerations, institutional effects in autocratic regimes may also depend on the type of coup staged (i.e., civilian or military) and the type of autocratic regime in place.

We explore the role of incumbent regime type in moderating the effect of coups on institutional change in Table 4. Political corruption is the dependent variable in models 1-3 and judicial

constraints in models 4-6. Models 1 and 4 serve as the baseline estimates of the effect of coup type on corruption and judicial constraints, respectively, and are analogous to model 10 from tables 2 and 3, controlling for multiple coup attempts, democracy, checks and balances and the number of previous coups. Models 2 and 5 introduce two dummy variables indicating whether the incumbent regime is a civilian or military dictatorship, with democratic regimes serving as the baseline, to control for regime type. Models 3 and 6 introduce interaction terms between each coup and regime type. We also report the p-values from tests of joint significance of the marginal effects of each of the coup type variables (Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006).

Controlling for the regime type in model 2 does not change the baseline results for political corruption and the regime type variables do not enter significant statistically. Model 3 introduces the coup-regime type interaction terms. We focus here on the marginal effects of the coup variables, finding that, consistent with our previous results, successful military coups are associated with more corruption. The results suggest that the corruption-enhancing effect of successful military coups is statistically stronger in autocratic than in initially democratic regimes, but there is no difference in the effect size between military and civilian dictatorships ( $p\text{-MilDiff} = 0.96$ ) Our results also suggest that successful civilian coups are associated with less corruption in initially democratic regimes and military dictatorships, but result in increased corruption in societies with already established civilian autocracy Meanwhile, the marginal effects of failed coup attempts by military and civilian leaders are not significant statistically.

*Insert Table 4 about here*The results in model 5 are nearly identical to the baseline estimates and the regime type variables are not significant predictors of judicial constraints. Model 6 suggests that the marginal effects of successful military coups, as well as those of both successful and failed civilian coup attempts, are significant predictors of judicial constraints. In initially democratic regimes, successful coups by the military and failed coup attempts by civilians are both associated with a reduction in

judicial constraints, while failed coups by the military and successful coups by civilians are associated with an improvement in judicial constraints. Successful military coups are also associated with a reduction in judicial constraints in authoritarian regimes and although the negative estimated effect size is larger in civilian than military dictatorship, the coefficient estimates are not statistically different from one another ( $p\text{-MilDiff} = 0.15$ ). Failed civilian coup attempts in autocratic regimes are also associated with a reduction in judicial constraints, but the difference in the estimates effects in civilian and authoritarian regimes is not significant statistically ( $p\text{-CivFDiff} = 0.28$ ). Lastly, we find that successful civilian coups are associated with enhanced judicial constraints in democratic and military dictatorships, with the effect in the former larger. Successful civilian coups in civilian dictatorships, however, are associated with a reduction in judicial constraints.

#### ***4.4. Additional Results***

We also performed a number of robustness tests, but for space we present most of these results in an online supplementary appendix. First, we examined pre-coup institutional trends to determine if institutional change may have influenced the outcome of a coup attempt. This is a potentially important test because we rely on the randomness of coup outcomes – i.e. the difference between failed and successful coups – for causal identification. Looking at the four years prior to a coup, the corruption trend is -0.125 before failed coups and -0.083 before successful coups. These trends are not statistically different from one another ( $p < .36$ ). For judicial constraints, the pre-coup trends are -0.012 and 0.032. Once again, these trends are not statistically different from one another ( $p < .52$ ). Thus, pre-coup trends in institutional change do not appear to influence the outcome of a coup attempt, which allows us to interpret the results causally.

Next, we re-estimated the main results presented in Tables 2 and 3 using the random effects estimator in lieu of fixed effects. The results are presented in Appendix Tables A3 and A4. We also re-estimate the results by regime type using the random effects estimator in lieu of fixed effects.

These results are presented in Appendix Table A6. The results are largely unchanged when using the random effects estimator.

We also decomposed the political corruption index into its four main components to examine how coups impact various types of corruption. We present these results in Appendix Table A5. They suggest that *MilCoupsSuccess* is associated with more executive, public, and judicial corruption. The results are qualitatively similar for legislature corruption but fail statistical significance when estimated using fixed effects.

Lastly, we checked the sensitivity of our results to countries experiencing two or more coup attempts within a short period of time, defined as a three-year period. We present these results in Appendix Table A7. Models 1 and 5 present baseline results using political corruption and judicial constraints as the dependent variables. Models 2 and 6 exclude countries from the sample experiencing two or more coup attempts at any point during the observation period. Models 3 and 7 only exclude country-year observations for which two or more coup attempts occurred within a three-year period, retaining the remaining country-year observations for these countries. Models 4 and 8 retain the entire sample but include a dummy variable to control for country-years in which two or more coup attempts occurred within a three-year period. The effects of coups remains qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates. In other words, successful military coups are associated with an increase in corruption and a reduction in judicial constraints. Failed civilian coup attempts are also associated with reduced judicial constraints, but this effect is not significant statistically in model 6, suggesting that countries with multiple coups attempts within a short period may be driving this relationship.

Overall, our main results are therefore robust to a set of intuitive additional tests. Given that the success probability of coups contains a large random component and is not significantly associated

with pre-coup trends in corruption and judicial constraints, we argue that we can also interpret the findings causally. We therefore conclude the paper by discussing the importance of the findings.

## 5. Conclusions

The aim of this paper is to explore how coups and coup attempts affect institutional quality. While many coup makers over the years have claimed that their aim was to oust corrupt regimes and improve on often very poor institutions, the subsequent development after coups succeeded has typically been disappointing. Our theoretical considerations also suggest that it may often be in the ex post interest of coup-makers to maintain or even weaken institutions. Once in power, they may have personal interests in the same kind of rents that the former elite enjoyed such that regime transitions do not alleviate institutional problems. As the saying goes in West Africa about the interests of new regimes, 'it's our time to eat'. Yet, we also note that civilian coup-makers may both have different interests and face different obstacles than military coup-makers, just as coup-makers from the existing elite can have different institutional interests than coup-makers from outside the incumbent elite.

We test these implications in a large panel of countries observed since 1950, which includes information on up to 537 successful and failed coup attempts, matched with data on corruption and judicial independence from the V-Dem project. Our results show that overall political corruption is significantly worsened as a result of successful military coups, an effect that appears mainly driven by military coups led by high-ranking military officers. In other words, the main negative effects on corruption appear after *intra-institutional* coups led by members of the incumbent elite.

Some of these results are mirrored in our findings for changes in judicial quality. We find that successful military coups typically lead to substantial reductions in judicial quality. However, distinguishing between types of incumbent regimes, our results also suggest that successful civilian

coups against military incumbents – coups that often exchange the specific elite in power – tend to lead to improved judicial quality. Our findings in this paper thus confirm the importance of separating coup types, as stressed in recent papers. Coups led by members of the incumbent elite may often be different in aim and execution than coups performed by groups outside of the political elite. Likewise, coups led by civilian interests often have very different consequences than coups led by military interests. As such, just as there are multiple varieties of democracy and autocracy, we find evidence that it is necessary to distinguish between multiple varieties of coups.

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
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Figure 1. Simple changes around coups



**Table 1: Components of the Political Corruption Index**

Variable	V-Dem Label	Question	Directionality
Public sector corruption index	v2x_pubcorr	To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?	Higher scores reflect more corruption
Executive corruption index	v2x_execorr	How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?	Higher scores reflect more corruption
Judicial corruption indicator	v2jucorrdc	How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?	Higher scores reflect less corruption
Legislature corruption indicator	v2lgcrrpt	Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.	Higher scores reflect less corruption

*Notes: See McMann et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion of the measurement methodology and statistical validation of the corruption measures. The scales of the legislature and judicial corruption indicators are reversed to match the direction of the public sector and executive corruption measures when aggregated for the political corruption index.*

**Table 2: Coups & Political Corruption**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Corruption (t-2)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.913*** (0.008)	0.902*** (0.012)	0.902*** (0.012)	0.908*** (0.013)	0.908*** (0.013)	0.902*** (0.012)
CoupSuccess (t-1)	0.018*** (0.004)									
CoupFail (t-1)	-0.001 (0.003)									
MilCoupFail (t-1)		-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)		-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)		0.020*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)		0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)
CivCoupFail (t-1)		0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)		0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.006)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)		0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)		0.015 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	0.009 (0.012)
MultiCoup (t-1)				-0.000 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.007)
Democracy (t-1)					0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)
ChecksBalances (t-1)						-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
HiMilFail (t-1)							-0.010* (0.006)			
LoMilFail (t-1)							0.000 (0.005)			
HiMilSuccess (t-1)							0.018*** (0.007)			
LoMilSuccess (t-1)							0.020* (0.011)			
HiCivSuccess (t-1)							0.020 (0.017)			
LoCivSuccess (t-1)							0.002 (0.016)			
HiCivFail (t-1)							-0.005 (0.008)			

**Table 2: Coups & Political Corruption**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LoCivFail (t-1)							0.004 (0.008)			
LnGDP (t-1)								-0.001 (0.003)		
PreviousCoups (t-1)										-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	8,838	8,838	8,838	8,838	8,458	8,409	8,409	6,637	6,523	8,409
Countries	166	166	166	166	160	160	160	139	139	160
Long Run Effect	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
R2w	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.19	0.18	0.13	0.13	0.19
Coup Type	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Multi Coup	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democracy	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Checks & Balances	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Coup Rank	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Limit Sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Prev Coup	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

*Fixed effects estimates of the effect of coups on political corruption. All models control for a two-year lag of corruption. Model 1 includes dummy variables indicating whether there was a successful or failed coup the previous year. Model 2 accounts for coup type (military or civilian). Model 3 controls for fixed year effects. Model 4 includes a dummy indicating whether multiple coups were attempted in the previous year. Model 5 controls for Democracy. Model 6 controls for Checks and Balances. Model 7 accounts for the rank of the coup leader. Model 8 controls for Ln of GDP per capita. Model 9 excludes GDP but limits the sample to country-year observations for which GDP data are available. Model 10 controls for the number of previous coup attempts. R2w denotes the within-country R-squared. Long-run effect is the long-run or cumulative effect of the CoupSuccess in model 1, MilCoupSuccess in model 2-6 and 8-10, and HiMilSuccess in model 7, calculated using the respective infinite geometric series multiplier (e.g.,  $b2/(1-b1)$ ). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous random effects estimates provided in Appendix Table A3. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$*

**Table 3: Coups & Judicial Constraints**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Judicial Constraints (t-2)	0.863*** (0.016)	0.863*** (0.016)	0.844*** (0.017)	0.844*** (0.017)	0.842*** (0.017)	0.726*** (0.032)	0.726*** (0.032)	0.745*** (0.031)	0.739*** (0.032)	0.726*** (0.032)
CoupSuccess (t-1)	-0.154*** (0.050)									
CoupFail (t-1)	-0.010 (0.033)									
MilCoupFail (t-1)		0.040 (0.046)	0.050 (0.045)	0.039 (0.043)	0.042 (0.045)	0.043 (0.043)		0.070 (0.051)	0.070 (0.050)	0.041 (0.043)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)		-0.177*** (0.042)	-0.145*** (0.040)	-0.166*** (0.044)	-0.169*** (0.045)	-0.119*** (0.040)		-0.075 (0.049)	-0.079 (0.049)	-0.122*** (0.041)
CivCoupFail (t-1)		-0.098* (0.051)	-0.090* (0.052)	-0.093* (0.051)	-0.095* (0.053)	-0.102* (0.053)		-0.116* (0.064)	-0.118* (0.064)	-0.104** (0.052)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)		-0.050 (0.136)	-0.038 (0.137)	-0.038 (0.137)	-0.042 (0.140)	-0.028 (0.130)		-0.036 (0.145)	-0.035 (0.146)	-0.030 (0.130)
MultiCoup (t-1)				0.165 (0.102)	0.165 (0.102)	0.158* (0.095)	0.168** (0.081)	0.131 (0.110)	0.142 (0.116)	0.155* (0.093)
Democracy (t-1)					0.014 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.024)
ChecksBalances (t-1)						0.238*** (0.041)	0.238*** (0.040)	0.224*** (0.040)	0.230*** (0.041)	0.238*** (0.040)
HiMilFail (t-1)							0.080 (0.093)			
LoMilFail (t-1)							0.013 (0.039)			
HiMilSuccess (t-1)							-0.157*** (0.048)			
LoMilSuccess (t-1)							-0.038 (0.069)			
HiCivSuccess (t-1)							0.149 (0.227)			
LoCivSuccess (t-1)							-0.070 (0.127)			
HiCivFail (t-1)							-0.330** (0.165)			

**Table 3: Coups & Judicial Constraints**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LoCivFail (t-1)							-0.041 (0.057)			
LnGDP (t-1)								0.009 (0.030)		
PreviousCoups (t-1)										-0.002 (0.006)
Observations	8,842	8,842	8,842	8,842	8,462	8,413	8,413	6,641	6,527	8,413
Countries	166	166	166	166	160	160	160	139	139	160
R2w	0.735	0.736	0.743	0.743	0.740	0.755	0.755	0.771	0.768	0.755
Long Run Effect	-1.130	-1.292	-0.932	-1.064	-1.071	-0.436	-0.575	-0.295	-0.303	-0.447
Coup Type	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Multi Coup	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democracy	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Checks & Balances	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Coup Rank	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Limit Sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Prev Coup	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

*Fixed effects estimates of the effect of coups on political judicial constraints. All models control for a two-year lag of judicial constraints. Model 1 includes dummy variables indicating whether there was a successful or failed coup the previous year. Model 2 accounts for coup type (military or civilian). Model 3 controls for fixed year effects. Model 4 includes a dummy indicating whether multiple coups were attempted in the previous year. Model 5 controls for Democracy. Model 6 controls for Checks and Balances. Model 7 accounts for the rank of the coup leader. Model 8 controls for Ln of GDP per capita. Model 9 excludes GDP but limits the sample to country-year observations for which GDP data are available. Model 10 controls for the number of previous coup attempts. R2w denotes the within-country R-squared. Long-run effect is the long-run or cumulative effect of the CoupSuccess in model 1, MilCoupSuccess in model 2-6 and 8-10, and HiMilSuccess in model 7, calculated using the respective infinite geometric series multiplier (e.g.,  $b_2/(1-b_1)$ ). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous random effects estimates provided in Appendix Table A3. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$*

**Table 4: Coups & Institutional Change by Regime Type**

	Political Corruption (1)	Political Corruption (2)	Political Corruption (3)	Judicial Constraints (4)	Judicial Constraints (5)	Judicial Constraints (6)
Institutions (t-2)	0.902*** (0.005)	0.902*** (0.005)	0.903*** (0.005)	0.726*** (0.008)	0.726*** (0.008)	0.727*** (0.008)
MilCoupFail (t-1)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.041 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.105** (0.050)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.122*** (0.028)	-0.138*** (0.029)	-0.058 (0.107)
CivCoupFail (t-1)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.104** (0.042)	-0.105** (0.042)	-0.046 (0.073)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)	0.009 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.056)	-0.019 (0.056)	0.036 (0.174)
MilDic (t-1)		-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)		0.024 (0.019)	0.023 (0.020)
CivDic (t-1)		0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)		-0.027 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)
MilCoupFail*MilDic (t-1)			0.003 (0.007)			-0.073 (0.063)
MilCoupFail*CivDic (t-1)			0.002 (0.009)			-0.138* (0.078)
MilCoupSuccess*MilDic (t-1)			0.020 (0.013)			-0.073 (0.110)
MilCoupSuccess*CivDic (t-1)			0.020 (0.018)			-0.238 (0.153)
CivCoupFail*MilDic (t-1)			0.022* (0.012)			-0.035 (0.102)
CivCoupFail*CivDic (t-1)			0.013 (0.012)			-0.143 (0.101)
CivCoupSuccess*MilDic (t-1)			-0.036 (0.027)			0.721*** (0.225)
CivCoupSuccess*CivDic (t-1)			0.020 (0.022)			-0.231 (0.186)



**Table 4: Coups & Institutional Change by Regime Type**

	Political Corruption (1)	Political Corruption (2)	Political Corruption (3)	Judicial Constraints (4)	Judicial Constraints (5)	Judicial Constraints (6)
Observations	8,409	8,409	8,409	8,413	8,413	8,413
Countries	160	160	160	160	160	160
Estimator	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
R-squared (within)	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.76	0.76	0.76
p-MilSucc			0.00			0.00
p-MilFail			0.64			0.15
p-CivSucc			0.01			0.00
p-CivFail			0.31			0.03
b-MilSuccMilDic			0.02			-0.13
b-MilSuccCivDic			0.02			-0.30
p-MilSuccDiff			0.96			0.15
b-CivSuccMilDic			-0.04			0.76
b-CivSuccCivDic			0.02			-0.20
p-CivSuccDiff			0.00			0.00
b-CivFailMilDic						-0.08
b-CivFailCivDic						-0.19
p-CivFailDiff						0.28

*Fixed effects estimates of the effects of coups on institutional change, by regime type. Political Corruption is the DV in model 1-3 and Judicial Constraints in models 4-6. Models 1 and 4 do not account for regime type and serve as the baseline estimates. Models 2 and 5 control for regime type by including two dummy variables indicating whether a civilian dictatorship or a military dictatorship are in place, with a democracy dummy variable serving as the omitted baseline regime type variable. Models 3 and 6 introduce interactions between coup and regime types to allow for differential institutional effects of coups by coup and regime type. All specifications control for multiple coup attempts, democracy, checks and balances, and number of previous coups, but these results are omitted for space. p-MilSucc, p-MilFail, p-CivSucc, and p-CivFail are the p-values from joint tests of significance of the corresponding marginal effects for each coup type. b-MilSuccMilDic and b-MilSuccCivDic denote the marginal effects of successful military coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-MilSuccDiff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the MilCoupSuccess interaction terms. b-CivSuccMilDic and b-CivSuccCivDic denote the marginal effects of successful civilian coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-CivSuccDiff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the CivCoupSuccess interaction terms. b-CivFailMilDic and b-CivFailCivDic denote the marginal effects of failed civilian coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-CivFailDiff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the CivCoupFail interaction terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous random effects estimates presented in Appendix Table A6. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.*

**Table A1: Summary Statistics**

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Institutional Variables					
Political Corruption Index	0.49	0.28	0.01	0.97	9,170
Executive Corruption	0.49	0.3	0.01	0.98	9,174
Public Sector Corruption	0.48	0.3	0.01	0.98	9,174
Legislature Corruption	0.22	1.46	-3.14	3.28	9,174
Judicial Corruption	0.01	1.34	-3.23	3.42	8,240
Judicial Constraints	0.12	1.44	-3.28	3.56	9,174
Coups Variables					
CoupSuccess	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	10,906
CoupFail	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	10,906
MilCoupFail	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	10,906
MilCoupSuccess	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	10,906
CivCoupFail	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00	10,906
CivCoupSuccess	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	10,906
HiMilFail	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00	10,906
LoMilFail	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00	10,906
HiMilSuccess	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00	10,906
LoMilSuccess	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00	10,906
HiCivSuccess	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	10,906
LoCivSuccess	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	10,906
HiCivFail	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	10,906
LoCivFail	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00	10,906
MultiCoup	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00	10,906
PrevCoups	1.64	2.83	0.00	17.00	14,889
Control Variables					
Democracy	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	13,875
Government Checks & Balances (ChecksBalances)	0.14	1.02	-2.15	2.29	9,119
Economic Development (LnGDP)	8.66	1.24	4.95	12.38	10,708
Regime Type: Civilian Dictatorship (CivDic)	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	10,906
Regime Type: Military Dictatorship (MilDic)	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00	10,906

**Table A2: Correlation Matrix**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)
(1) Political Corruption	1.00	0.93	0.93	-0.91	-0.86	-0.58	0.06	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.27	0.21	-0.20	-0.61	-0.12
(2) Executive Corruption	0.93	1.00	0.90	-0.79	-0.75	-0.62	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.29	0.27	-0.21	-0.68	-0.10
(3) Public Sector Corruption	0.93	0.90	1.00	-0.80	-0.72	-0.57	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.26	0.27	-0.21	-0.64	-0.11
(4) Legislature Corruption	-0.91	-0.79	-0.80	1.00	0.71	0.58	-0.07	-0.10	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.26	-0.22	0.21	0.57	0.14
(5) Judicial Corruption	-0.86	-0.75	-0.72	0.71	1.00	0.41	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.18	-0.07	0.12	0.42	0.07
(6) Judicial Constraints	-0.58	-0.62	-0.57	0.58	0.41	1.00	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.33	-0.39	0.29	0.79	0.22
(7) CoupSuccess	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.07	-0.05	-0.04	1.00	-0.01	0.04	0.85	0.01	0.53	0.07	-0.01	0.75	0.40	0.26	0.51	0.05	-0.01	0.26	0.07	0.00	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03
(8) CoupFail	0.10	0.09	0.09	-0.10	-0.07	-0.03	-0.01	1.00	0.79	-0.01	0.55	-0.01	0.53	0.59	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.19	0.52	0.08	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.03
(9) MilCoupFail	0.08	0.06	0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.03	0.04	0.79	1.00	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.70	0.71	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.13	0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.05	-0.03
(10) MilCoupSuccess	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.85	-0.01	0.05	1.00	0.02	0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.88	0.47	0.00	0.12	0.06	-0.01	0.31	0.10	-0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.03
(11) CivCoupFail	0.06	0.06	0.05	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	0.55	-0.01	0.02	1.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.39	0.92	0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
(12) CivCoupSuccess	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.53	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
(13) HiMilFail	0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.07	0.53	0.70	0.08	-0.01	0.00	1.00	-0.01	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.00	-0.01	0.19	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01
(14) LoMilFail	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.59	0.71	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	1.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
(15) HiMilSuccess	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.75	-0.01	0.05	0.88	-0.01	0.00	0.07	-0.01	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.23	0.10	-0.03	0.00	-0.05	-0.02
(16) LoMilSuccess	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.40	-0.01	0.03	0.47	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.17	0.12	0.00	0.22	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03
(17) HiCivSuccess	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
(18) LoCivSuccess	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.51	-0.01	0.05	0.12	0.03	0.77	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.10	0.00	0.26	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
(19) HiCivFail	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.05	0.19	0.00	0.06	0.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.10	1.00	0.00	0.12	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01
(20) LoCivFail	0.05	0.06	0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.52	-0.01	-0.01	0.92	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01
(21) MultiCoup	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.26	0.08	0.13	0.31	0.05	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.23	0.22	0.00	0.26	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.02
(22) Civilian Autocracy	0.27	0.29	0.26	-0.26	-0.18	-0.33	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.10	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	1.00	-0.32	-0.11	-0.36	-0.07
(23) Military Autocracy	0.21	0.27	0.27	-0.22	-0.07	-0.39	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.04	0.04	0.06	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.32	1.00	-0.13	-0.49	-0.18
(24) Democracy	-0.20	-0.21	-0.21	0.21	0.12	0.29	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.11	-0.13	1.00	0.26	0.41
(25) Checks and Balances	-0.61	-0.68	-0.64	0.57	0.42	0.79	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.36	-0.49	0.26	1.00	0.20
(26) LnGDP	-0.12	-0.10	-0.11	0.14	0.07	0.22	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.18	0.41	0.20	1.00

**Table A3: Coups & Political Corruption – RE Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Corruption (t-2)	0.971*** (0.004)	0.971*** (0.004)	0.976*** (0.003)	0.976*** (0.003)	0.976*** (0.003)	0.960*** (0.005)	0.961*** (0.005)	0.968*** (0.005)	0.968*** (0.005)	0.959*** (0.006)
CoupSuccess (t-1)	0.020*** (0.005)									
CoupFail (t-1)	0.002 (0.003)									
MilCoupFail (t-1)		-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)		0.022*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)		0.012** (0.006)	0.012** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)
CivCoupFail (t-1)		0.005 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)		0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.004 (0.006)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)		0.011 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.013 (0.012)		0.019 (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)
MultiCoup (t-1)				-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.007)
Democracy (t-1)					-0.004** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
ChecksBalances (t-1)						-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)
HiMilFail (t-1)							-0.008 (0.006)			
LoMilFail (t-1)							0.002 (0.005)			
HiMilSuccess (t-1)							0.018*** (0.007)			
LoMilSuccess (t-1)							0.025** (0.012)			
HiCivSuccess (t-1)							0.024 (0.016)			
LoCivSuccess (t-1)							0.005 (0.017)			
HiCivFail (t-1)							-0.004 (0.007)			

**Table A3: Coups & Political Corruption – RE Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LoCivFail (t-1)							0.006 (0.007)			
LnGDP (t-1)								-0.002** (0.001)		
PreviousCoups (t-1)										0.000 (0.000)
Observations	8,838	8,838	8,838	8,838	8,458	8,409	8,409	6,637	6,523	8,409
Countries	166	166	166	166	160	160	160	139	139	160
Long Run Effect	0.708	0.769	0.866	0.88	0.89	0.505	0.459	0.384	0.373	0.49
R2w	0.851	0.851	0.854	0.854	0.848	0.849	0.849	0.849	0.847	0.849
Coup Type	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Multi Coup	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democracy	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Checks & Balances	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Coup Rank	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Limit Sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Prev Coup	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

*Random effects estimates of the effect of coups on political corruption. All models control for a two-year lag of corruption. Model 1 includes dummy variables indicating whether there was a successful or failed coup the previous year. Model 2 accounts for coup type (military or civilian). Model 3 controls for fixed year effects. Model 4 includes a dummy indicating whether multiple coups were attempted in the previous year. Model 5 controls for Democracy. Model 6 controls for Checks and Balances. Model 7 accounts for the rank of the coup leader. Model 8 controls for Ln of GDP per capita. Model 9 excludes GDP but limits the sample to country-year observations for which GDP data are available. Model 10 controls for the number of previous coup attempts. R2w denotes the within-country R-squared. Long-run effect is the long-run or cumulative effect of the CoupSuccess in model 1, MilCoupSuccess in model 2-6 and 8-10, and HiMilSuccess in model 7, calculated using the respective infinite geometric series multiplier (e.g.,  $b_2/(1-b_1)$ ). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous fixed effects estimates provided in Table A2. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$*

**Table A4: Coups & Judicial Constraints – RE Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Judicial Constraints (t-2)	0.963*** (0.006)	0.963*** (0.006)	0.961*** (0.006)	0.960*** (0.006)	0.959*** (0.006)	0.890*** (0.016)	0.889*** (0.016)	0.900*** (0.015)	0.900*** (0.016)	0.890*** (0.016)
CoupSuccess (t-1)	-0.159*** (0.052)									
CoupFail (t-1)	-0.015 (0.033)									
MilCoupFail (t-1)		0.039 (0.049)	0.038 (0.047)	0.026 (0.044)	0.028 (0.046)	0.048 (0.045)		0.080 (0.054)	0.079 (0.054)	0.046 (0.045)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)		-0.177*** (0.044)	-0.162*** (0.044)	-0.183*** (0.048)	-0.185*** (0.049)	-0.140*** (0.044)		-0.091* (0.052)	-0.095* (0.053)	-0.141*** (0.044)
CivCoupFail (t-1)		-0.109** (0.050)	-0.113** (0.050)	-0.117** (0.049)	-0.119** (0.052)	-0.095* (0.050)		-0.106* (0.060)	-0.106* (0.060)	-0.097* (0.050)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)		-0.077 (0.143)	-0.080 (0.144)	-0.080 (0.144)	-0.084 (0.148)	-0.060 (0.140)		-0.043 (0.152)	-0.043 (0.152)	-0.062 (0.140)
MultiCoup (t-1)				0.167 (0.108)	0.162 (0.109)	0.160 (0.104)	0.172* (0.089)	0.130 (0.124)	0.135 (0.130)	0.162 (0.104)
Democracy (t-1)					0.029** (0.012)	0.023* (0.014)	0.023* (0.014)	0.019 (0.017)	0.029** (0.015)	0.022 (0.014)
ChecksBalances (t-1)						0.125*** (0.021)	0.126*** (0.021)	0.113*** (0.020)	0.115*** (0.021)	0.127*** (0.021)
HiMilFail (t-1)							0.099 (0.100)			
LoMilFail (t-1)							0.006 (0.040)			
HiMilSuccess (t-1)							-0.171***			
LoMilSuccess (t-1)							-0.073 (0.077)			
HiCivSuccess (t-1)							0.124 (0.239)			
LoCivSuccess (t-1)							-0.102 (0.138)			
HiCivFail (t-1)							-0.337** (0.156)			

**Table A4: Coups & Judicial Constraints – RE Estimates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LoCivFail (t-1)							-0.031 (0.055)			
LnGDP (t-1)								0.012 (0.008)		
PreviousCoups (t-1)										0.002 (0.002)
Observations	8,842	8,842	8,842	8,842	8,462	8,413	8,413	6,641	6,527	8,413
Countries	166	166	166	166	160	160	160	139	139	160
R2w	0.735	0.736	0.741	0.741	0.738	0.749	0.749	0.766	0.762	0.749
Long Run Effect	-4.275	-4.740	-4.110	-4.618	-4.555	-1.276	-1.536	-0.907	-0.944	-1.280
Coup Type	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Multi Coup	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democracy	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Checks & Balances	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Development	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Coup Rank	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Limit Sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Prev Coup	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

*Random effects estimates of the effect of coups on political judicial constraints. All models control for a two-year lag of judicial constraints. Model 1 includes dummy variables indicating whether there was a successful or failed coup the previous year. Model 2 accounts for coup type (military or civilian). Model 3 controls for fixed year effects. Model 4 includes a dummy indicating whether multiple coups were attempted in the previous year. Model 5 controls for Democracy. Model 6 controls for Checks and Balances. Model 7 accounts for the rank of the coup leader. Model 8 controls for Ln of GDP per capita. Model 9 excludes GDP but limits the sample to country-year observations for which GDP data are available. Model 10 controls for the number of previous coup attempts. R2w denotes the within-country R-squared. Long-run effect is the long-run or cumulative effect of the CoupSuccess in model 1, MilCoupSuccess in model 2-6 and 8-10, and HiMilSuccess in model 7, calculated using the respective infinite geometric series multiplier (e.g.,  $b2/(1-b1)$ ). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous random effects estimates provided in Table A3. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$*

**Table A5: Coups & Corruption, by Corruption Type**

	Executive Corruption	Executive Corruption	Public Sector Corruption	Public Sector Corruption	Judicial Corruption	Judicial Corruption	Legislature Corruption	Legislature Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Corruption (t-2)	0.835*** (0.006)	0.936*** (0.004)	0.871*** (0.005)	0.947*** (0.003)	0.871*** (0.005)	0.957*** (0.003)	0.929*** (0.005)	0.965*** (0.003)
MilCoupFail (t-1)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.109*** (0.019)	-0.121*** (0.019)	-0.056 (0.035)	-0.060* (0.035)
CivCoupFail (t-1)	0.003 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.031)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.010 (0.009)	0.015* (0.009)	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.067* (0.039)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.045 (0.049)
Observations	8,413	8,413	8,413	8,413	8,413	8,413	7,281	7,281
Countries	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
Estimator	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE
R2w	0.76	0.76	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.86	0.86
p-Hausman		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00

*Panel estimates of the effect of coups on corruption, by type of corruption. Fixed effects estimates in odd-numbered models. Random effects estimates in even-numbered models. The corruption measure for each model is indicated in the column header. All models control for a two-year lag of respective corruption measure, fixed time effects, and single lags of democracy, checks and balances, and a multiple coup indicator variable. These results and constant estimate omitted for space. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .*



**Table A6: Coups & Institutional Change by Regime Type**

	Political Corruption (1)	Political Corruption (2)	Political Corruption (3)	Judicial Constraints (4)	Judicial Constraints (5)	Judicial Constraints (6)
Institutions (t-2)	0.959*** (0.003)	0.958*** (0.003)	0.961*** (0.003)	0.890*** (0.005)	0.888*** (0.005)	0.887*** (0.005)
MilCoupFail (t-1)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.046 (0.028)	0.044 (0.028)	0.119** (0.052)
MilCoupSuccess (t-1)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.141*** (0.029)	-0.148*** (0.029)	-0.032 (0.111)
CivCoupFail (t-1)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.097** (0.043)	-0.096** (0.043)	-0.011 (0.076)
CivCoupSuccess (t-1)	0.013* (0.007)	0.011* (0.007)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.062 (0.058)	-0.051 (0.058)	0.110 (0.180)
MilDic (t-1)		-0.003* (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)		-0.004 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)
CivDic (t-1)		0.003* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)		-0.030** (0.014)	-0.022 (0.014)
MilCoupFail*MilDic (t-1)			0.003 (0.008)			-0.096 (0.065)
MilCoupFail*CivDic (t-1)			0.001 (0.009)			-0.125 (0.080)
MilCoupSuccess*MilDic (t-1)			0.023* (0.013)			-0.113 (0.114)
MilCoupSuccess*CivDic (t-1)			0.018 (0.018)			-0.276* (0.158)
CivCoupFail*MilDic (t-1)			0.023* (0.012)			-0.091 (0.106)
CivCoupFail*CivDic (t-1)			0.013 (0.012)			-0.166 (0.105)
CivCoupSuccess*MilDic (t-1)			-0.039 (0.027)			0.663*** (0.232)
CivCoupSuccess*CivDic (t-1)			0.018 (0.022)			-0.359* (0.192)

**Table A6: Coups & Institutional Change by Regime Type**

	Political Corruption (1)	Political Corruption (2)	Political Corruption (3)	Judicial Constraints (4)	Judicial Constraints (5)	Judicial Constraints (6)
Observations	8,409	8,409	8,409	8,413	8,413	8,413
Countries	160	160	160	160	160	160
Estimator	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE
R-squared (within)	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.75	0.75	0.75
p-MilSucc			0.00			0.00
p-MilFail			0.89			0.13
p-CivSucc			0.01			0.00
p-CivFail			0.22			0.05
b-MilSuccMilDic			0.02			-0.14
b-MilSuccCivDic			0.02			-0.31
p-MilSuccDiff			0.68			0.17
b-CivSuccMilDic			-0.03			0.77
b-CivSuccCivDic			0.02			-0.25
p-CivSuccDiff			0.00			0.00
b-CivFailMilDic						-0.10
b-CivFailCivDic						-0.18
p-CivFailDiff						0.47

*Random effects estimates of the effects of coups on institutional change, by regime type. Political Corruption is the DV in model 1-3 and Judicial Constraints in models 4-6. Models 1 and 4 do not account for regime type and serve as the baseline estimates. Models 2 and 5 control for regime type by including two dummy variables indicating whether a civilian dictatorship or a military dictatorship are in place, with a democracy dummy variable serving as the omitted baseline regime type variable. Models 3 and 6 introduce interactions between coup and regime types to allow for differential institutional effects of coups by coup and regime type. All specifications control for multiple coup attempts, democracy, checks and balances, and number of previous coups, but these results are omitted for space. p-MilSucc, p-MilFail, p-CivSucc, and p-CivFail are the p-values from joint tests of significance of the corresponding marginal effects for each coup type. b-MilCoup\_MilDic and b-MilCoup\_CivDic denote the marginal effects of successful military coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-MilS\_Diff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the MilCoupSuccess interaction terms. b-CivS\_MilDic and b-CivS\_CivDic denote the marginal effects of successful civilian coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-CivS\_Diff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the CivCoupSuccess interaction terms. b-CivF\_MilDic and b-CivF\_CivDic denote the marginal effects of failed civilian coups in military and civilian dictatorship, respectively. p-CivF\_Diff is the p-value from an equality of coefficient test of the CivCoupFail interaction terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Analogous FE estimates reported in Table 4. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.*

**Table A7: Sensitivity Checks to Multiple Coup Attempts within 3 Years**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Political Corruption	Political Corruption	Political Corruption	Political Corruption	Judicial Constraints	Judicial Constraints	Judicial Constraints	Judicial Constraints
Institutions	0.902*** (0.012)	0.913*** (0.015)	0.860*** (0.017)	0.855*** (0.017)	0.726*** (0.032)	0.756*** (0.035)	0.665*** (0.040)	0.642*** (0.039)
MilCoupFail	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.014 (0.009)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.055 (0.045)	0.020 (0.026)	0.018 (0.038)	0.030 (0.035)
MilCoupSuccess	0.019*** (0.005)	0.039* (0.021)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)	-0.099*** (0.037)	-0.302** (0.116)	-0.129*** (0.049)	-0.106*** (0.038)
CivCoupFail	0.002 (0.006)	0.010 (0.016)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.098* (0.053)	-0.051 (0.105)	-0.148** (0.057)	-0.111** (0.055)
CivCoupSuccess	0.010 (0.012)	0.005 (0.027)	0.012 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)	-0.028 (0.130)	-0.077 (0.141)	0.006 (0.127)	-0.000 (0.119)
Multiple Coups				0.001 (0.006)				0.042 (0.051)
Observations	8,409	5,083	7,990	8,249	8,413	5,086	7,994	8,253
Countries	160	103	160	160	160	103	160	160
Estimator	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
R-squared (within)	0.85	0.86	0.78	0.77	0.76	0.80	0.68	0.65
Specification	Baseline	Exclude Countries	Exclude Multi	Control Multi	Baseline	Exclude Countries	Exclude Multi	Control Multi
Institutional Lag	t-2	t-2	t-3	t-3	t-2	t-2	t-3	t-3
Controls Lagged	t-1	t-1	t-2	t-2	t-1	t-1	t-2	t-2

*Fixed effects estimates of coups on institutional change. Sensitivity to countries experiencing multiple coup attempts within a 3-year period. Political corruption and Judicial Constraints are DV in models 1-4 and 5-8, respectively. All models control for Democracy, Checks and Balances, and time fixed effects - results omitted for space. Models 1 and 5 are baseline estimates for comparison. Models 2 and 6 exclude countries that experienced multiple coups within 3 years from sample. Models 3 and 7 exclude country-year observations for which multiple coups occurring during a 3-year period. Models 4 and 8 control for the effect of multiple coup attempts within a 3-year period by including a dummy variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.*

**Table A8. Coup attempts since 2000**

Country	Date	Type	Country	Date	Type
<i>The Comoros</i>	Mar 2000	Civ	Guinea	Dec 2008	Mil
<i>Djibouti</i>	Dec 2000	Civ	<i>Malawi</i>	Jun 2008	Civ
Ecuador	Jan 2000	Civ	Mauritania	Aug 2008	Mil
Fiji	May 2000	Civ	<i>Timor-Leste</i>	Feb 2008	Civ
<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	Nov 2000	Mil	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	Aug 2008	Mil
<i>Paraguay</i>	May 2000	Mil	<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	Nov 2008	Mil
Solomon Islands	Jun 2000	Civ	Honduras	Jun 2009	Civ
<i>Burundi</i>	Apr 2001	Mil	Madagascar	Mar 2009	Civ
<i>Burundi</i>	Jul 2001	Mil	<i>Togo</i>	May 2009	Civ
<i>Central African Republic</i>	May 2001	Mil	Guinea-Bissau	Apr 2010	Civ
<i>Comoros</i>	Dec 2001	Mil	Kyrgyzstan	Apr 2010	Civ
<i>Cote d'Ivoire</i>	Sep 2002	Mil	<i>Madagascar</i>	Nov 2010	Mil
<i>Venezuela</i>	Apr 2002	Civ	Niger	Feb 2010	Mil
Central African Republic	Mar 2003	Mil	<i>Bangladesh</i>	Dec 2011	Mil
Guinea-Bissau	Sep 2003	Mil	<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	Jun 2012	Civ
<i>Mauritania</i>	Jun 2003	Mil	Guinea-Bissau	Apr 2012	Mil
Sao Tome and Principe	Jul 2003	Mil	The Maldives	Jul 2012	Civ
<i>Chad</i>	May 2004	Mil	Mali	Mar 2012	Mil
<i>DR Congo</i>	Jun 2004	Mil	<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	Jan 2012	Mil
<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	Mar 2004	Civ	<i>Benin</i>	Feb 2013	Civ
Haiti	May 2004	Civ	<i>Chad</i>	May 2013	Civ
<i>Mauritania</i>	Sep 2004	Mil	<i>The Comoros</i>	Apr 2013	Civ
Mauritania	Aug 2005	Mil	<i>DR Congo</i>	Dec 2013	Civ
Nepal	Feb 2005	Royal	Egypt	Jul 2013	Mil
Togo	Feb 2005	Mil	<i>Libya</i>	Oct 2013	Mil
<i>Chad</i>	Apr 2006	Mil	<i>Libya</i>	May 2014	Mil
Fiji	Dec 2006	Mil	<i>The Gambia</i>	Dec 2014	Mil
<i>Philippines</i>	Feb 2006	Mil	Thailand	May 2014	Mil
Thailand	Sep 2006	Mil	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	Sep 2015	Mil
Bangladesh	Jan 2007	Mil	<i>Burundi</i>	May 2015	Mil
<i>Laos</i>	Jun 2007	Mil	<i>Libya</i>	Nov 2016	Civ
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	Jun 2007	Mil	<i>Turkey</i>	Jul 2016	Mil
<i>Chad</i>	Feb 2008	Civ	Zimbabwe	Nov 2017	Civ
<i>Cook Islands</i>	Jun 2008	Civ	<i>Gabon</i>	Jan 2019	Mil
<i>The Gambia</i>	Aug 2008	Mil	Sudan	Apr 2019	Mil

Note: Entries in *italics* denote failed coup attempts.